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The literature about both sovereign risk spreads and central bank communication has 
evolved, but separately. The present study aims to fill this gap analyzing the relation 
between central bank communication and the sovereign risk spreads. We provide 
empirical evidence of the effects of monetary policy signaling and clarity of central bank 
communication over the sovereign risk spreads. The results indicate the sovereign risk 
spreads respond to the monetary policy signaling. Moreover, the clarity of the central 
bank communication can reduce the sovereign risk spreads. 
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A literatura sobre ambos o spread de risco soberano e a comunicação do banco 
central evoluíram, mas separadamente. O presente estudo busca preencher esta 
lacuna analisando a relação entre a comunicação do banco central e o spread do risco 
soberano. Fornecemos evidências empíricas sobre os efeitos da sinalização da 
política monetária e da clareza da comunicação do banco central sobre o spread do 
risco soberano. Os resultados indicam que o spread do risco soberano responde às 
sinalizações da política monetária. Ademais, a clareza da comunicação do banco 
central é capaz de reduzir o spread do risco soberano.  
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Sovereign risk is the risk related to the government capacity to honor its debts 
punctually and integrally. The sovereign risk is an important information to investors 
and reflect the quality of the government bonds, which may reflect in the debt costs.  
Emerging economies face challenges related to external vulnerability and volatility. 
These challenges increase the sovereign risk, which implies in a higher spread of the 
emerging markets bonds. Sovereign risk spread is result of higher uncertainties. 
Furthermore, the spread in the emerging markets bonds is a good measure of 
sovereign risk spreads (AMADOU, 2011). Besides, sovereign risk spreads can be 
influenced by macroeconomic fundamentals, external factors and economic policies 
(MONTES; TIBERTO, 2012).  
Nowadays, there is plenty of evidence that monetary policy can benefit from the 
central bank communication and clarity (BLINDER et al., 2008; JANSEN 2011a). To 
communicate clearly reduce the cost to disinflation and anchor the inflation 
expectations. Thus, central bank communication and clarity can influence the market’s 
expectations. Moreover, the conduction of the monetary policy can reduce the risks 
associated with higher inflation and macroeconomic volatility. In this sense, central 
bank communication can affect the sovereign risk spreads.  
Studies relating monetary policy and sovereign risk spreads are still scarce in 
the literature.  Montes and Tiberto (2012) measures the effect of monetary policy 
credibility and reputation over the EMBI. The findings suggest a higher credibility and 
reputation of the monetary policy can reduce the sovereign risk spreads. The present 
work contributes to the literature since it provides evidence of the influence of central 
bank communication and clarity over the sovereign risk spreads.  
The literature about both sovereign risks spreads and central bank 
communication has evolved, but evolved separately. The present study aims to fill this 
gap analyzing the relation between central bank communication and the sovereign risk 
spreads, measured through the EMBI+ 1  index calculated by the JP Morgan. In 
particular, this study has the following objectives: (i) to analyze whether the monetary 
policy signaling relates to the EMBI+; (ii) to study the relation between the clarity of the 
 
1 Emerging Markets Bond Index. 
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central bank communication and the EMBI+; and (iii) to observe whether the previous 
relations depends on the level of the sovereign risk spread.  
Besides this introduction, section 2 presents the literature about the 
determinants of the sovereign risk spread. Section 3 reviews the studies about central 
bank communication and clarity. In section 4 we introduce the data and methodology. 
Section 5 explores the results and section 6 concludes.  
 
The macroeconomic determinants of the sovereign risk spread 
 
In this section, we discuss the literature about the determinants of the sovereign 
risk spreads. Several works investigated this issue, although some points are still 
under debate or not enough explored. The literature does not provide evidence on the 
effect of the central bank communication and clarity, and how it can explain the 
behavior of the sovereign risk spreads in emerging economies.  
Kamin and Kleist (1999) studies the behavior of the emerging markets credit 
spreads, measured through the Brady bonds. The study aims to analyze the external 
factors and concludes that variation in industrialized country short-term interest rates 
explain little in the decline of the emerging markets credit spreads. Amadou (2001) 
uses a simple univariate model with panel data to analyze the sovereign risk of 
emerging economies. The results indicate an asymmetric adjustment of spreads and 
ratings and highlight the disagreement between market and rating agencies.  
In contrast, Eichengreen and Mody (1998) focus on the domestic economic 
fundamentals. The results indicate the quality of the credit influences the spread. 
Moreover, the changes in the fundamentals explain only a part of the change in the 
spreads. In line, Arora and Cerisola (2001) analyze the impact of changes in US 
monetary policy on the sovereign risk spreads, measured by the EMBI+. The results 
suggest that the level of the US interest rates has positive effects over the sovereign 
bond spreads. Although countries enjoy a significant degree of freedom to influence 
country risk and economic growth. Strong and sustainable fiscal policy and a low level 
of indebtedness are extremely important in reducing country risk and country interest 
rates. In turn, Baek et al. (2005) analyze the determinants of the sovereign risk 
premium assessed by the market, as measured by the yield spread of Brady bonds. 
The results suggest that liquidity, solvency and economic stability variables 
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significantly affect the country risk premium. However, the results indicate that the 
market's attitude towards risk plays an important role in determining the market risk 
premium. 
Kennedy and Palerm (2014) compare the importance of the external and 
domestic conditions to determine emerging market bond spreads. The results suggest 
that, during the subprime crisis, it was movements in the risk measure that explained 
much of the observed changes in EMBI spreads. Moreover, the data suggests that 
markets differentiated between countries and that this was in part related to domestic 
fundamentals. The empirical results indicate that countries with viable fiscal positions, 
low external debt levels, low political risk and healthy foreign exchange reserves 
contributed to an improvement in the EMBI.   
Özmen and Yaşar (2016) analyses the impacts of sovereign credit ratings and 
global financial conditions on the evolution of EMBI Global (EMBIG) spreads. The work 
uses panel data analysis for 23 developing countries for the period between 1998 and 
2012. The findings suggest that credit ratings along with global financial conditions are 
the main determinants of EMBIG spreads. 
Considering the Brazilian economy, Andrade and Teles (2005) analyzes the 
relationship between macroeconomic variables and the Brazilian sovereign risk 
spreads using a country beta model. In this model, the Brazilian risk is a variable in 
time parameter that corresponds to the relation between the returns of the Brazilian 
stock market and the returns of the stock market of the rest of the world. The analysis 
is conducted using time series for the period from January 1991 to December 2002. 
The results show that monetary policy has a significant and stable impact on the 
country risk. Moreover, international reserves have a significant impact only in the 
period of fixed exchange rate. 
Ferreira (2010) analyzes the sovereign risk determinants for the Brazilian 
economy. The analysis was done for the period from April 1995 to June 2008, using 
the general non-restricted model (GUM). The results show that macroeconomic 
fundamentals, such as the current account deficit to GDP ratio, public debt/GDP ratio 
and imports largely explain the EMBI+ spreads. Furthermore, de Mendonça and Nunes 
(2011) analyze the relationship between a fiscal authority committed to the stabilization 
of the debt/GDP ratio and the sovereign risk. The findings indicate that a proper 
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management of public debt and the use of primary surplus targets ensure a sound 
strategy to promote the fall in the risk premium. 
Regarding the monetary policy effects over the EMBI, Montes and Tiberto 
(2012) analyzes the role of macroeconomic fundamentals, credibility of monetary 
policy and the reputation of the central bank in reducing the country risk. The results 
suggest that monetary policy and public debt management, as well as the credibility 
and reputation of the monetary policy, affect the country risk premium.  
The literature about the determinants of sovereign risk spreads discusses the 
external and domestic determinants, providing evidence about the role of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Some works also study the importance of the fiscal and 
monetary policy. Although, to our knowledge, there is no work analyzing the effects of 
monetary policy signaling and clarity of central bank communication over the sovereign 
risk spreads.  
 
Central bank communication and clarity 
 
Central communication plays an important role in the task of guiding markets 
expectations. It can reduce the asymmetric information between the central bank and 
the public. Moreover, the success of the central bank communication depends on the 
level of clarity (JANSEN, 2011a).  
Blinder et al. (2008) defines central bank communication as the provision of 
information by the central bank to the public regarding present and future monetary 
policy, the economic outlook and the goals of the central bank. Jansen (2011a) argues 
that is impossible to reach a high degree of transparency without central bank 
communication. Thus, central bank communication is important to move markets and 
anchor expectations.  
The literature on central bank communication provided plenty of empirical 
evidence about its effects over financial markets, equity markets and macroeconomic 
performance (BLINDER et al., 2008). However, the studies paid much less attention to 
the overall clarity of central bank communication (BULÍŘ; ČIHÁK; JANSEN 2013). The 
clarity of central bank communication can be defined as the quality of the information 
and the capacity of comprehension the public has regarding what central bank 
communicates (JANSEN, 2011a). Thus, one can argue which is the importance of 
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clarity of central bank communication, but so far, only few studies aimed to answer this 
question.  
Jansen (2011a, 2011b) first introduced the readability indexes (FLESCH, 1948 
and KINCAID et al., 1975) as measures of the clarity of central bank communication. 
Both works analyzed the effects of clarity over financial markets volatility. Montes et al. 
(2016) verified if the clarity of central bank communication affects the disagreement of 
inflation expectations in Brazil. Also regarding the Brazilian economy, Montes and 
Nicolay (2016) analyzed the relation between monetary policy credibility and clarity. 
The study concludes clarity of central bank communication improves monetary policy 
credibility, but only if the central bank is committed to its goals. 
Hence, to provide further evidence on the effect that central bank 
communication and clarity has on the economy, we investigate the effect of these 
variables over the sovereign risk spread, measured through the EMBI. To provide 
information to the markets’ participants may reduce the degree of uncertainty, reducing 
the risk in the emerging markets bonds.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section, we describe the data and methodology used in the empirical 
analysis. The objective is to study the relation between central bank communication 
and clarity and sovereign risks spreads.   
We analyze the Brazilian economy. Brazil is the biggest emerging economy in 
the Latin America and in 1999 the CBB (Central Bank of Brazil) adopted the inflation 
target regime. Since then, the CBB has presented a high degree of transparency and 
regular communication with the public. Fracasso, Genberg and Wyplosz (2003) ranked 
Brazil as one of the highest in terms of central bank transparency. In this sense, Brazil 
is a good laboratory to analyze.  
The first step is to define which type of central bank communication we consider. 
According to Blinder et al. (2008), there are two types of central bank communication: 
(i) official releases and (ii) communication through the specialized media. We focus on 
the official releases, following the existent literature about central bank communication 
and clarity to the Brazilian economy. (COSTA-FILHO; ROCHA, 2009 and 2010; 
MONTES; SCARPARI, 2015; MONTES; NICOLAY, 2016 and 2017; TABORDA, 2015; 
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MONTES et al., 2016). The Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) releases two official 
announcements related to inflation and monetary policy, the inflation report, published 
quarterly with focus on the economic background, and the minutes of the Brazilian 
Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) meetings. We focus on the COPOM minutes, 
which give information about the present and future economic outlook and the path of 
monetary policy. Moreover, it is recommended to use the minutes in order to avoid the 




The database contains 154 monthly observations from March 2003 to February 
2016. We choose this period because prior to this date there was no standard for the 
period of time that the minutes of the COPOM meetings were published after each 
meeting. Moreover, after 2006, the COPOM meetings started happening every 45 
days. To adequate the variables related to the central bank communication to the 
monthly analysis, we repeat the last value in the months there is no minutes, following 




 To measure the sovereign risk spread we use the EMBI+, calculated by JP 
Morgan. We extract the monthly average from the daily data. We use this index rather 
than traditional spreads over U.S. Treasury because they control for floating coupons 
and unusual features (AMADOU, 2011). Moreover, the EMBI+ measures most traded 
external-currency-denominated debt instruments of the countries. The EMBI+ 
presents, in base points, the spread of the emerging markets bonds.  
 To measure the impact of the fiscal result on the sovereign risk spread, we use 
the Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR) in the primary concept, from the 
Brazilian National Treasury (series 5793 from the CBB). If the PSBR increases, we 
expect the sovereign risk spread to increase, because it reduces the capacity and 
confidence that the government is able to honor its debts. The output gap (GAP) is 
extracted from the IBC-BR (Central Bank Economic Index – series 24364 from the 
CBB) by applying the Hoddrik-Prescott filter. The output gap indicates the 
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macroeconomic performance. When the output is above (below) its trend, there is a 
high (low) economic activity, which reduces (increases) the sovereign risk spread.  
 The international reserves as a percentage of the GDP (RES/GDP) indicate the 
exposure to international issues. Following Williamson (1973) and Montes and Tiberto 
(2012), international reserves indicates the degree of liquidity of the country. The 
international liquidity measures the capacity of the country to honor the current account 
and to respond to external shocks. Hence, it is expected a negative relation between 
the international reserves and the sovereign risk spread.  
In relation to monetary policy, we include two variables in the model, inflation 
rate (INF – series 13522 from the CBB) and the basic real interest rate (IR – calculated 
from the basic interest rate series, 4189 from the CBB, subtracting the inflation rate, 
series 13522 from the CBB). The inflation rate indicates the monetary stability and is 
the main goal of monetary policy. Lower inflation rates indicate more stable 
macroeconomic environment and a committed central bank, reducing the sovereign 
risk spread. In the case of the basic real interest rate, it is the main instrument of 
monetary policy. Moreover, both the interest rate and inflation rate are the main 
indexing factors of the public debt. Hence, an increase in these variables increase the 
risk premium of the Treasuries Bonds (DE MENDONÇA; NUNES, 2011). 
 
Monetary Policy Signaling 
 
 One of the main objectives of this work is to find evidence on the effect of the 
monetary policy signaling over the EMBI. To measure the monetary policy signaling, 
we follow the methodology of Rosa and Verga (2007) and analyze the COPOM 
minutes. We construct two dummies to measure if the central bank communication 
signals an increase or a decrease in basic interest rate. The dummy D_UP receives 
value 1 if the central bank signals an increase in the interest rate and 0 otherwise. The 
dummy D_DOWN receive values 1 if the central bank signals and decrease in the 
interest rate and 0 otherwise. The glossary used to classify the minutes is presented 
in the table A.1 in the appendix.  
 
Clarity of the central bank communication 
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 The clarity of central bank communication is calculated considering readability 
measures. Several works consider readability indexes as a proxy for clarity of central 
bank communication (e.g., JANSEN, 2011a and 2011b; JANSEN; MOESSNER, 2016; 
MONTES et al., 2016; MONTES; NICOLAY, 2017). We consider two measures in this 
work: the Flesch Ease Score, (FLESCH 1948) and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level 
(KINCAID et al, 1978). Theses indexes considers only textual characteristics.  
The Flesch (1948) statistic (FI) indicates the easiness to read the text. The index 
utilizes textual aspects as the number of words per sentences and the number of 
syllables per word. The formula of the index is: 
FI = 206.835 − 1.015 × (#word/#sentences) − 84.6 × (#syllables/#words) 
 The index proposed by Kincaid et al. (1975) (FKI) represents the years of study 
needed to fully understand the text. This interpretation makes easier to compare 
different values. The formula of the index is:  
FKI = 0.39 × (#word/#sentences) + 11.8 × (#syllables/#words) – 15.59 
  
Figure 1 – Clarity indexes 
 
Soucer: Authors’ elaboration 
 
Methodology   
 
To measure the effects of the monetary policy signaling, clarity and 
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 Where ε1 to ε6 are the error term. The model is based on the existing literature 
about the macroeconomic determinants of the sovereign risk in the emerging 
economies. Moreover, we include a dummy for the subprime crisis, which receives 
value 1 to the period between September 2008 and September 2009, and 0 otherwise. 
The lags of the variables were determined empirically, considering the general-to-
specific method. We consider the principle of parsimony and observe the statistical 
significance of the coefficients (HENDRY, 2001). 
The first condition to validate the econometric analysis with time series data is 
to check if the series are stationary. This work performs the Kwaitowski-Phillips-Shin 
(KPSS) stationarity test. This test has the advantage over the conventional tests as 
they do not reject the null hypothesis too often (FRANSES; HALDRUP, 1994; CATI et 
al., 1999). Furthermore, Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) indicates that the test is adequate to 
small samples. According to this test, all series are stationary. The result is presented 
in the table A.2 in the appendix.  
 We estimate the equations by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM), two-step GMM and Quantile Regression. These methods 
provide a straightforward interpretation of the coefficients, allowing one to observe the 
direction and statistical significance of the coefficients. Due to the presence of serial 
autocorrelation and heterokedasticity of unknown form, we estimate OLS and GMM 
with the Newey and West (1987) covariance matrix.  
 Due to the problems of endogeneity and simultaneity, common in time series 
analysis, we estimate all equations using the GMM, which provide robust estimates in 
the presence of this problem (HANSEN, 1982). In the GMM estimates, the instrumental 
variables play an important role. We follow the methodology of Johnston (1984) and 
include the same variables of the model lagged as instruments. Time series variables 
usually present a strong autoregressive component. Hence, this methodology provides 
instruments highly correlated with the variables in the model, and independent from 
the error term. We perform the J-statistic to check the orthogonality of the instruments. 
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The Durbin-Wu-Hausman2 test indicates if the regressors are exogenous. Moreover, 
to avoid small sample bias problems, we estimate the two-step GMM with the 
Windmeijer (2005) covariance matrix. 
  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the OLS and GMM estimates for the equation 1 to 6 are presented 
in the table 1. The Ramsey-RESET test indicates that all specifications are adequate. 
Moreover, in the GMM estimates, the J-statistic test shows that the instruments are 
orthogonal in relation to the error term. Furthermore, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
indicates the regressor are exogenous.  
 All the estimated coefficients presented the expected signal. The estimates 
indicate the PSBR has a positive relation with the EMBI. This result shows that an 
increase in the PSBR also increases the sovereign risk spread. This evidence 
corroborates previous results founded by de Mendonça and Nunes (2011). The fiscal 
result is essential to indicate the capacity of the Govern to honor its debts. Hence, if 
the PSBR decreases, it means a higher primary surplus, increasing the resources 
available to reduce the public debt. This mechanism reduces the sovereign risk and 
reduces the bond spreads. The output gap presented a negative signal. I.e., an 
increase in the economic activity reduces the sovereign risk spread.  
The inflation presents a positive effect over the EMBI, this result shows that 
higher inflation leads to higher sovereign risk, increasing the spread in the Brazilian 
bonds. The real interest rate has a positive relation to the EMBI. An increase in the 
basic real interest rate increases the spread in the Brazilian bond. Both variables are 
the main indexers of the Brazilian public debt. Hence, an increasing in these variables 
also increases the cost of the public debt, which means a higher sovereign risk spread. 
The subprime crisis affected markets around the world. The emerging 
economies observed a negative capital flow in the period. In this sense, the dummy 
variables for the period of the subprime crisis presented a positive signal. 
Corroborating the idea of Kennedy and Palerm (2014), during the subprime crisis, the 
spread of the Brazilian bonds increased due to the increase of the risk perception.  
 
2 Based on the works of Durbin (1954), Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978). 
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The main analysis of this study lies in the effect of the economic transparency, 
monetary policy signaling and clarity of the central bank communication over the 
sovereign risk spread. The economic transparency presented a negative and 
significant signal in the OLS and GMM estimates – and a positive but not significant 
signal in the two-step GMM estimates. This result corroborates the idea that the 
economy can benefit from the reduction of asymmetric information between central 
bank and the markets. When the central bank is more transparent, it reduces the 
sovereign ris spreads.  
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Table 1 – OLS and GMM estimates 
C -47.141 -29.939 -70.221 * -36.694 -793.462 *** 178.992 *** -63.479 -67.085 * -111.605 ** -68.529 -133.647 *** 164.964 ** -26.584 -43.831 -86.830 -37.583 -928.725 ** 154.448
(44.330) (45.439) (38.263) (43.029) (209.988) (62.152) (44.151) (34.906) (43.540) (37.083) (265.811) (67.327) 60.119 52.864 60.530 47.008 468.758 108.072
PSBR-1) 12.234 * 3.658 11.579 * 11.364 * 11.816 * 13.061 ** 14.579 *** -4.809 11.123 ** 8.752 * 11.234 ** 12.412 ** 17.015 ** 2.396 11.947 10.225 14.819 * 14.509 *
(6.797) (7.691) (6.264) (6.124) (6.250) (6.139) (5.409) (6.891) (5.376) (5.181) (4.961) (5.030) 7.537 11.685 8.061 6.653 8.062 8.308
GAP(-9) -11.385 ** -14.959 *** -12.253 ** -10.630 ** -8.585 ** -8.724 ** -13.264 *** -22.266 *** -13.016 *** -10.470 *** -12.732 *** -12.707 *** -12.769 *** -17.578 *** -11.553 *** -9.388 *** -13.120 *** -12.813 ***
(4.982) (3.681) (4.805) (5.102) (3.896) (4.192) (2.790) (3.678) (2.804) (2.711) (2.504) (2.304) 4.324 5.934 3.991 3.476 4.564 3.567
INF(-3) 57.221 *** 55.472 *** 56.510 *** 54.357 *** 56.276 *** 56.427 *** 49.414 *** 51.836 *** 47.688 *** 44.857 *** 61.436 *** 58.777 *** 45.739 *** 48.497 *** 44.570 *** 41.572 *** 58.354 *** 56.380 ***
(5.500) (5.042) (5.454) (5.394) (4.852) (4.766) (4.513) (4.625) (3.690) (4.494) (4.201) (4.020) 6.758 7.022 5.978 6.085 7.749 7.026
IR(-1) 10.124 ** 11.987 *** 11.706 *** 12.893 *** 11.349 *** 10.137 *** 14.474 *** 16.000 *** 16.754 *** 17.993 *** 12.846 *** 12.001 *** 12.906 *** 13.855 *** 15.721 *** 16.154 *** 12.789 *** 11.364 **
(4.170) (3.411) (3.662) (3.587) (3.569) (3.871) (2.758) (2.750) (2.087) (2.303) (3.009) (3.260) 4.281 4.369 2.653 3.399 4.817 5.333
RES/GDP(-1) -41.780 *** -38.724 *** -40.702 *** -41.300 *** -40.573 *** -40.443 *** -18.704 * -15.929 -10.349 -9.742 -36.646 *** -29.342 *** -20.899 -17.731 -9.608 -10.259 -34.663 * -28.959 *
(13.756) (11.752) (13.334) (12.619) (11.433) (11.727) (10.863) (10.993) (10.847) (9.573) (10.192) (10.329) 16.280 18.070 14.382 11.737 17.836 16.160
SUBPRIME 77.678 ** 103.714 *** 87.672 *** 84.872 ** 48.670 53.918 * 217.361 *** 230.562 *** 214.776 *** 222.076 *** 107.749 *** 137.305 *** 224.261 *** 240.724 *** 221.033 *** 232.265 *** 137.380 ** 152.941 ***
(35.056) (25.963) (32.939) (36.155) (36.141) (32.533) (37.852) (31.175) (26.450) (28.500) (33.948) (34.225) 52.194 52.294 39.127 46.284 58.828 51.331
TFL -81.548 ** -146.556 *** -86.770
(33.810) (40.074) 68.975
D_UP 29.727 ** 46.490 *** 42.975 *
(13.306) (12.854) 22.342
D_DOWN -47.285 ** -56.946 *** -51.927 **
(21.975) (14.650) 20.345
FKI 41.052 *** 57.259 *** 47.215 *
(11.342) (14.110) 24.909
FI -9.272 *** -10.538 *** -9.172 **
(2.350) (2.735) 4.362
Ajusted R² 0.636 0.648 0.646 0.659 0.672 0.660 0.489 0.531 0.522 0.531 0.614 0.584 0.466 0.489 0.506 0.503 0.590 0.567
F-statistic 42.861 38.852 38.577 40.721 43.224 40.897
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ramsey-RESET 0.287 4.539 0.724 0.124 1.015 1.008
(p-value) 0.593 0.035 0.396 0.726 0.316 0.317
Rank 26 29 29 29 29 29 26 29 29 29 29 29
Durbin-Wu-Hausn 0.890 1.671 4.408 2.607 2.486 3.030 0.775 1.515 5.000 2.846 2.011 2.263
(p-value) 0.989 0.976 0.732 0.919 0.928 0.882 0.993 0.959 0.660 0.899 0.959 0.944
J-statistic 14.045 13.134 12.985 13.306 18.886 17.045 13.881 14.934 13.377 13.781 18.030 16.454
(p-value) 0.781 0.904 0.909 0.898 0.592 0.708 0.791 0.826 0.895 0.879 0.647 0.744
(6)
OLS





Source: Author’s estimates. Notes: Marginal Significance Levels: *** denotes 0.01, ** denotes 0.05 and * denotes 0.1. Coefficients in bold, standard errors in 
parentheses. Due to the problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, the reported t-statistics in the OLS and GMM estimates are based on the estimator 
of Newey and West (1987). 
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The monetary policy signaling follows the same direction of the basic interest 
rate. I.e. when the central bank indicates an increase in the interest rate, the EMBI also 
increases. Moreover, an indication of a reduction in the basic interest rate reduces the 
EMBI. This result shows the importance of the central bank communication. If the 
central bank has successfully moved the markets with his announcements, it reduces 
the need to move the basic interest rate. Furthermore, these results indicate that the 
international markets also consider the CBB announcements and its content.   
In relation to the clarity indexes, the result indicates that an improvement in the 
clarity of the central bank communication reduces the EMBI. It is important to 
communicate, but the message should be clear enough to be fully understood by the 
market. The result indicates that an improvement in the clarity may reduce the 
sovereign risk spreads. 
In general, the results indicates that a good strategy related to the central bank 
transparency and communication may reduce the sovereign risk spreads. If the central 
bank is succeeded in reducing the information asymmetry in relation to the markets, it 
helps to reduce the EMBI.  
 
Interaction between the clarity and the monetary policy signaling  
 
 In this section, to provide further evidences on the effect of the clarity and the 
monetary policy signaling over the sovereign risk spread, we measure the effect of the 
interaction between clarity and monetary policy signaling over the EMBI. We consider 
only the FI clarity index in this section. The interaction variables are constructed 
multiplying the monetary policy signaling dummies for the FI index. Hence, we estimate 
the following equations:  
71 72 1 73 9 74 3 75 1 76 1 77 78 7
81 82 1 83 9 84 3 85 1 86 1 87 88 8
/ _UP*          (7)
/ _ *  (8)
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
EMBI PSBR GAP INF IR RES GDP Subprime D FI
EMBI PSBR GAP INF IR RES GDP Subprime D DOWN FI
        
        
− − − − −
− − − − −
= + + + + + + + +
= + + + + + + + +
 Where ε7 and ε8 are the error term. The results are presented in table 2. The 
idea is to observe the effect of the clarity of central bank communication and monetary 
policy communication together.  
The results of the estimates corroborate the signals founded in the Table 1. The 
Ramsey-RESET test indicates there is no problems of identification. Moreover, the 
 
Revista Saber Digital, v. 13, n. 1, p. 1 - 25, 2020                                                                                 15 
 
instrumental variables are adequate, according to the J-statistic. The Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test provide evidence that the regressors are exogenous.  
 In relation to the variables of interaction between the monetary policy signaling 
and the clarity index, the results indicate that the monetary policy signaling, considering 
the quality of the information released, moves the sovereign risk spread in the same 
direction of the basic interest rate. Although all coefficients are statistically significant, 
the values are lesser – in an absolute perspective – than the effect of monetary policy 
signaling and clarity obtained at the table 1.  This result may indicate a low quality of 
the information released, once the effect is reduced when considered the clarity of the 
announcement.  
Table 2 – OLS and GMM estimates 
C -67.441 * -33.131 -115.467 ** -54.282 -70.297 -26.340
(39.215) (42.715) (46.407) (35.088) (60.185) (41.090)
PSBR(-1) 11.529 * 11.242 * 9.870 * 10.486 ** 11.539 10.939
(6.416) (6.161) (5.687) (4.924) (8.254) (6.615)
GAP(-9) -12.251 ** -10.488 ** -12.393 *** -11.302 *** -9.895 ** -10.379 ***
(4.863) (4.979) (3.032) (2.787) (4.325) (3.654)
INF(-3) 56.546 *** 53.632 *** 46.003 *** 44.740 *** 40.202 *** 41.527 ***
(5.513) (5.036) (4.228) (4.428) (6.254) (5.813)
IR(-1) 11.513 *** 13.168 *** 17.778 *** 17.352 *** 16.121 *** 15.194 ***
(3.738) (3.650) (2.084) (2.374) (2.819) (3.306)
RES/GDP(-1) -40.964 *** -40.950 *** -5.957 -14.492 -5.134 -14.174
(13.543) (12.477) (10.530) (9.754) (14.282) (12.797)
SUBPRIME 87.458 ** 83.777 ** 244.593 *** 220.022 *** 255.308 *** 227.632 ***
(33.670) (35.865) (35.777) (31.149) (46.400) (48.762)
D_UP*FI 1.106 * 1.715 *** 1.554 *
(0.565) (0.487) (0.803)
D_DOWN*FI -2.223 ** -2.308 *** -1.921 ***
(0.944) (0.494) (0.721)





Rank 29 29 29 29
Durbin-Wu-Hausn 1.574 1.833 2.004 2.537
(p-value) 0.980 0.969 0.960 0.924
J-statistic 15.597 12.976 14.457 13.207
(p-value) 0.792 0.909 0.849 0.901
(7) (8) (7) (8)
OLS GMM TWO- STEP GMM
(8) (7)
Source: Author’s estimates. Notes: Marginal Significance Levels: *** denotes 0.01, ** denotes 
0.05 and * denotes 0.1. Coefficients in bold, standard errors in parentheses. Due to the problems 
of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, the reported t-statistics in the OLS and GMM estimates 









In addition to the previous results, we estimate a simpler model using Quantile 
Regression in order to observe the effects of the monetary policy signaling, economic 
transparency and clarity over the sovereign risk spread, considering the level of the 
EMBI. Introduced by Koenker and Basset (1978), the Quantile Regression allows one 
to observe the differences in the estimated coefficients considering different levels of 
the dependent variable. In this sense, it is possible to observe if the estimated effects 
depends on the level of the sovereign risk spread. We estimate the Quantile 
Regression with moving blocks bootstrap (MBB), which provides robust standard 
errors to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form (FITZENBERGER, 
1997). 
The estimated model considers the central idea of the previous sections, the 
relation between transparency, communication and clarity and the EMBI. We include 
the lagged EMBI to capture the effects of all other variables. Hence, we estimate the 
following specifications:  
 
91 92 1 93 9
101 102 1 103 10
                                                                    (9)
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−
−
= + + +
= + + +
111 112 1 113 11
121 122 1 123 12
_                                                     (11)




EMBI EMBI D DOWN
EMBI EMBI FKI
EMBI
   
   
−
−
= + + +
= + + +
= 131 132 1 133 13
141 142 1 143 14
151
                                                                  (13)





EMBI EMBI D UP FI
EMBI
   





= + + +
= 152 1 153 15_ *                                             (15)tEMBI D DOWN FI  −+ + +
 
  
Table 3 presents the results to the Quantile Regression estimates. In general, 
the results corroborate the previous findings. In relation to the TFL, the estimated 
coefficients indicate the effect over the EMBI is stronger in the central quantiles. 
Moreover, to very low and very high values of EMBI, the TFL presented no statistical 
significance. 
The monetary policy signaling dummies, D_UP and D_DOWN, presents the 
expected signal in all quantiles. Although, they only present statistical significance 
between the second and eight quantile. Moreover, it is not possible to observe a strong 
evidence related to differences in the effect of monetary policy signaling in different 
parts of the EMBI distribution.  
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In relation to the clarity indexes, FKI and FI, it is possible to observe that the 
clarity of the central bank communication is able to reduce the EMBI only in the upper 
quantiles. This result indicates that the quality of information is important in moments 
of high risk. In these moments, improvements in the clarity helps to reduce the 
sovereign risk spreads, as the markets understand better the central bank intention 
and acts. On the other hand, if the central bank reduces the clarity of it statements, it 
may increase the risk. In the lower quantiles, the clarity indexes presents the opposite 
signal, indicating that in moments of very low risk, the clarity may increase the 
sovereign risk spread. Although, only the second quantile coefficient of the FI estimates 
present statistical significance.  
The interaction between monetary policy signaling dummies and the clarity 
indexes, D_UP*FI and D_DOWN*FKI, confirms the results in the previous sections. It 
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Table 3 – Quantile Regression Estimates 
OLS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
CONSTANT 22.851*** 22.222*** 25.275*** 24.515*** 22.044*** 22.851*** 30.743*** 18.388* 24.759** 21.542
(7.787) (7.961) (6.147) (5.049) (7.177) (7.695) (10.074) (9.484) (10.803) (23.509)
EMBI (-1) 0.935*** 0.849*** 0.865*** 0.898*** 0.935*** 0.935*** 0.947*** 0.997*** 0.993*** 1.021***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.021) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.061)
TFL -22.713** -14.682 -16.337** -21.818*** -26.165*** -22.713** -28.046** -16.918** -13.849* 5.625
(10.167) (10.435) (7.909) (7.153) (9.149) (10.182) (11.252) (7.143) (8.021) (25.955)
CONSTANT 9.0115 12.104 11.514** 10.646** 7.157 9.011 15.301 5.585 12.271 28.875
(6.608) (9.533) (5.768) (4.973) (5.052) (6.528) (9.906) (9.390) (9.647) (23.182)
EMBI (-1) 0.934*** 0.844*** 0.867*** 0.888*** 0.919*** 0.934*** 0.935*** 0.992*** 0.994*** 0.996***
(0.022) (0.031) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.075)
D_UP 5.643 6.220 6.539** 5.957* 6.776* 5.643 8.170 11.299** 8.472 5.425
(4.623) (6.035) (2.990) (3.271) (3.913) (4.682) (6.258) (5.231) (5.811) (14.441)
CONSTANT 15.525** 15.320** 16.110*** 14.360*** 13.026** 14.954** 16.526* 15.434* 16.739* 34.414*
(5.963) (6.895) (5.332) (4.484) (5.612) (5.802) (9.837) (8.784) (9.994) (18.214)
EMBI (-1) 0.929*** 0.855*** 0.871*** 0.898*** 0.920*** 0.929*** 0.945*** 0.992*** 1.007*** 1.006***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.035) (0.029) (0.032) (0.064)
D_DOWN -10.589** -11.751 -6.363 -9.645*** -7.819** -10.018** -9.201 -9.848* -11.548* -12.927
(4.513) (7.905) (4.141) (3.370) (3.632) (4.563) (6.629) (5.233) (5.853) (13.113)
CONSTANT 19.679 103.784 25.769 78.825 8.167 19.679 -112.655 -215.440** -371.787** -662.492***
(72.893) (80.474) (69.909) (54.466) (63.392) (73.241) (76.199) (91.405) (143.0285) (101.279)
EMBI (-1) 0.935*** 0.849*** 0.861*** 0.893*** 0.906*** 0.935*** 0.955*** 0.959*** 0.999*** 1.018
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.0159) (0.018) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029) (0.043) (0.028)
FKI -0.488 -4.992 -0.611 -3.657 0.268 -0.488 7.019* 13.051** 21.845*** 38.248***
(4.036) (4.602) (4.021) (3.003) (3.460) (4.032) (4.182) (5.158) (8.066) (5.671)
CONSTANT -1.76 -29.251 -40.000 -15.128 -15.091 -1.760 16.160 41.084 51.296 190.942***
(20.379) (34.691) (31.592) (19.680) (20.537) (20.399) (27.816) (35.837) (46.899) (43.567)
EMBI (-1) 0.936*** 0.861*** 0.883*** 0.900*** 0.903*** 0.936*** 0.944*** 0.976*** 1.011*** 0.995***
(0.018) (0.031) (0.022) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.033) (0.042) (0.031)
FI 0.526 1.606 2.111* 1.121 1.224 0.526 -0.031 -1.073 -1.572 -6.597***
(0.833) (1.216) (1.172) (0.793) (0.868) (0.834) (1.110) (1.290) (1.734) (1.687)
CONSTANT 8.825 12.104* 11.526** 10.339** 7.157 8.825 15.301 6.654 12.271 28.875
(6.604) (6.789) (5.724) (4.837) (5.151) (6.611) (9.867) (8.672) (10.191) (21.580)
EMBI (-1) 0.935*** 0.844*** 0.866*** 0.889*** 0.919*** 0.935*** 0.935*** 0.991*** 0.994*** 0.996***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.034) (0.029) (0.032) (0.072)
D_UP*FI 0.246 0.268 0.278** 0.244* 0.281* 0.246 0.319 0.450** 0.384 0.233
(0.182) (0.214) (0.121) (0.133) (0.151) (0.183) (0.252) (0.209) (0.243) (0.548)
CONSTANT 16.218*** 16.124** 16.110*** 16.321*** 13.326** 16.218*** 16.435* 16.473* 20.195* 34.382*
(6.007) (6.477) (5.286) (4.415) (5.630) (5.923) (9.824) (9.199) (10.548) (18.635)
EMBI (-1) 0.925*** 0.852*** 0.871*** 0.890*** 0.918*** 0.925*** 0.946*** 0.988*** 0.996*** 1.006***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.035) (0.030) (0.033) (0.065)
D_DOWN*FI -0.416** -0.507* -0.299* -0.388*** -0.325** -0.416** -0.390 -0.394* -0.504** -0.547
(0.181) (0.289) (0.164) (0.136) (0.141) (0.1800) (0.281) (0.236) (0.246) (0.513)
Quantiles
Source: Authors’ estimates. Notes: Marginal Significance Levels: *** denotes 0.01, ** denotes 0.05 and * denotes 
0.1. Coefficients in bold and standard errors in. Regarding OLS estimates, due to the problems of autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity, the reported t-statistics in the OLS estimates are based on the estimator of Newey and 
West (1987). In the quantile regression, we follow Fitzenberger (1997) and we use moving blocks bootstrap (MBB) 










The present work addressed empirical evidences on the relation between 
economic transparency, monetary policy signaling and clarity of central bank 
communication and the sovereign risk spread, measured by the EMBI+. The model 
considers the economic fundamentals explored in the literature, and the results 
corroborated previous findings.  
The contribution of this study is the evidence that the economic transparency, 
and also the clarity of the central communication, can reduce the sovereign risk spread. 
This result shows that the central bank can benefit of being transparent and reducing 
the asymmetric information with the market. When the market’ participants have more 
information about the central bank actions, and more accessible information on the 
central bank announcements, it provides a better understanding of the economic 
outlook and reduce the sovereign risk spread.  
Furthermore, the monetary policy signaling is able to move the EMBI in the 
same direction of the basic interest rate. This evidence suggests that international 
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Table A.1. Glossary of key words and expressions from minutes of COPOM meetings 
to build the Dummy variables of monetary policy signalling 
 




Table A.2 – KPSS stationarity test 
 
  Forma Bandwidth Teste 1% 5% 10% 
EMBI I/T 43.7 0.157 0.216 0.146 0.119 
FI I/T 12.6 0.094 0.216 0.146 0.119 
FKI I/T 11.7 0.095 0.216 0.146 0.119 
GAP I/T 30.1 0.109 0.739 0.463 0.347 
INF I 34.2 0.160 0.739 0.463 0.347 
IR I/T 58.5 0.136 0.216 0.146 0.119 
PSBR I/T 83 0.384 0.216 0.146 0.119 
TFL I/T 30.60 0.155 0.22 0.15 0.12 
Source: Author’s elaboration. “I” denotes intercept and “T” denotes trend. We use the Andrews 
Bandwidth selection.  
 
Dummy variable Key words
D_up – The monetary policy should remain especially vigilant.
– Maintenance of the interest rate represents a non-negligible risk for meeting the target (projected inflation above target).
– Risks to achieving the goal.
– Potential inflationary impacts of supply shocks yet to materialize.
– Monetary policy should remain vigilant in order to avoid the propagation of shocks and exchange rate depreciation.
– Monetary policy firmly committed to meeting the inflation targets.
– Inflation remains high / monetary policy should be firm.
– The monetary authority will be ready to adopt an active posture if projected inflation diverges from the target.
– Inflation trend incompatible with the target.
– Copom will need to be less tolerant if shocks threaten to raise inflation above the target.                                                        
– The Central Bank will not allow supply shocks to lead to an increase in the inflation rate.
– The Committee understands that it is appropriate to continue the adjustment pace of the monetary conditions underway.
– The monetary authority must remain vigilant so that short-term pressures do not contaminate longer time horizont                                                                                                                                                                                    
– The monetary authority should be ready to adjust the pace and magnitude of the interest rate
adjustment process to the circumstances
D_down – copom decided to continue the process of monetary easing.                                                                                         
– Expected inflation below target/expectations consistent with the inflation risks/targets are less significant.                                                                                                                                                                                 
– Consolidation of favourable perspectives for inflation in the medium term / copom considers that there is still room for 
further cuts in the selic rate in the future.                                                                                                                           
– Benign scenario for the evolution of inflation (with reduction of uncertainties / favourable external scenario).                                                                                                                                                                 
– Economic activity consistent with supply conditions, with low probability of inflation pressures.  
– The gradual easing of the monetary stance will not compromise the important achievements made in lowering inflation
